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FOREWORD
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and advanced
conventional arms remains one of the gravest threats to the security of
the international community. Countries of concern continue to pursue
WMD by purchasing related technologies and components from foreign
suppliers.
Export controls represent one of the key elements of a comprehensive
nonproliferation strategy. They include procedures adopted by countries
to regulate and monitor trade in weaponry and weapons-related (dualuse) technologies. However, the effectiveness of export control as a tool
for limiting the spread of sensitive technologies and weaponry has been
compromised by globalization and a complex array of international
developments. The distinction between military and commercial products,
for example, has become less clear. Therefore, it is likely that export control
policies and institutions need to be continually adjusted if they are to serve
international security objectives.
How countries in the Asia region respond to the relentlessly changing
nature of the proliferation challenge will affect profoundly the shape of
global security. In many instances, the countries of the region are major
transshipment and assembly points for critical strategic dual-use goods
and technologies. Some of these countries are major producers of strategic
items, while others are or have potential to become suppliers. Yet, national
export control systems in the region, with a few exceptions, remain
rudimentary and resource-poor.
This monograph examines the current state of export control system
development in the greater Asia region, with particular emphasis on
the economic and security environment in which these systems operate.
Identiﬁcation then is made of the gains and remaining deﬁciencies in
export control development. The monograph concludes by examining the
applicability of the European Union’s effort to coordinate export controls
to the regional forces shaping the regional trade and security dynamics in
Asia and what the United States can do to facilitate greater export control
development and cooperation.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
As recent investigations into the vast nuclear network fronted
by Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan have made clear, the black market
in nuclear supplies operated with ease and impunity. Much of this
network was located and operated in Malaysia, a country with, at
best, a rudimentary export control system. Through normal trade
channels, the constituent components of nuclear weapons originated
in and transited through this Asian nation, serving to draw further
attention to how states in this economically dynamic region oversee
the trade in strategic goods and technologies.
Export controls represent one of the key elements of a
comprehensive nonproliferation strategy. They include procedures
adopted by countries to regulate and monitor trade in weaponry
and weapons-related (dual-use) technologies. However, the
effectiveness of export control as a tool for limiting the spread of
sensitive technologies and weaponry has been compromised by
globalization and a complex array of international developments.
The distinction between military and commercial products, for
example, has become less clear. Therefore, it is likely that export
control policies and institutions need to be continually adjusted if
they are to serve international security objectives.
Regional export control standards are quite varied. For example,
over the past 2 years, China passed legislation related to nuclear,
chemical and biological, missile, and military exports. Taiwan
updated its export regulations with regards to Mainland trade.
South Korea implemented a catch-all regulation. And Singapore
passed legislation strengthening state control over the export of
strategic goods, including munitions and related dual-use goods.
Other states, such as Laos, Myanmar, and Malaysia, have made only
minor, primarily legislative, changes, most of which are superﬁcial.
For example, despite U.S. efforts to persuade Malaysia to adopt more
stringent nuclear export controls, its foreign minister said that he
did not currently “see any necessity” to sign the Additional Protocol
to Malaysia’s nuclear safeguards agreement. Recent disclosures
about Libya’s nuclear program revealed that a Malaysian ﬁrm
manufactured some of Tripoli’s nuclear equipment.
v

How countries in the Asia region respond to the relentlessly
changing nature of the proliferation challenge will affect profoundly
the shape of global security for many years. In many instances,
the countries of the region are major transshipment and assembly
points for critical strategic dual-use goods and technologies. Some
of these countries are already major producers of strategic items,
while others are or have potential to become suppliers. Yet, national
export control systems in the region, with a few exceptions, remain
rudimentary and resource-poor.
As Asia develops into a clearly demarcated economic “region,”
it is confronted by similar export control challenges as those faced
in Europe with the advent of the Common Market. As such, a
regional system of export control standards and practices emerged
as a means to ensure not only economic parity, but regional and
international security as well. While not necessarily as advanced in
terms of regional identity as the European free trade area, the states
of Asia could beneﬁt proﬁtably from a regional approach to export
control development and coordination.
In addition, the states of Asia could also gain from increased
export control cooperation with the United States. As a global leader
in nonproliferation, the United States can provide critical assistance
to export control development efforts through training and the
allocation of other resources. Likewise, the United States should
focus its export control outreach efforts to the less developed export
control systems in Asia, especially the transshipment countries.
The intersection of trade and security cuts to the heart of the
matter in Asia, where national economies profoundly depend on
trade, as they do on regional and international security. The internal
challenge for countries of the Asia region is to develop systems
compatible with their political, economic, and security needs, while
addressing the overall threat posed by the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction.
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CURRENT AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
FOR ASIAN NONPROLIFERATION EXPORT CONTROLS:
A REGIONAL RESPONSE
INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and
advanced conventional arms remains one of the gravest threats to
the security of the international community. Countries of concern
continue to pursue WMD by purchasing related technologies and
components from foreign suppliers. Recent disclosures regarding
the extent of Pakistan’s involvement in nuclear proliferation
suggest the security ramiﬁcations of international trade remain vital
concerns. Of increasing alarm, too, is the tangible threat posed by
terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda that are seeking to inﬂict
mass casualties, a fact in keeping with the increasing lethality of
international terrorism.1 Furthermore, unregulated arms transfers
can introduce instability and conﬂict into countries and regions,
making them breeding grounds for terrorism.
A great deal of policy attention and resources has been
directed towards addressing this proliferation threat, as well
as towards securing nuclear materials from possible theft or
sabotage. Nevertheless, policymakers should not overlook that
most countries and terrorists seek to purchase the components they
need for developing WMD.2 Consequently, greater attention and
resources need to be devoted to strengthening export controls, with
consideration for the needs of legitimate trade.
Export controls represent one of the key elements of a
comprehensive nonproliferation strategy. They include procedures
adopted by countries to regulate and monitor trade in weaponry
and weapons-related (dual-use) technologies. However, the
effectiveness of export control as a tool for limiting the spread of
sensitive technologies and weaponry has been compromised by
globalization and a complex array of international developments.
The distinction between military and commercial products, for
example, has become less clear.3 Therefore, it is likely that export
control policies and institutions need to be adjusted continually if
they are to serve international security objectives.
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How countries in the Asia region respond to the relentlessly
changing nature of the proliferation challenge will affect profoundly
the shape of global security for many years.4 In many instances,
the countries of the region are major transshipment and assembly
points for critical strategic dual-use goods and technologies.5 Some
of these countries are already major producers of strategic items,
while others are or have potential to become suppliers.6 Yet, national
export control systems in the region, with a few exceptions, remain
rudimentary and resource-poor.7
This monograph examines the current state of export control
system development in the greater Asia region, with particular
emphasis on the economic and security environment in which
these systems operate. Identiﬁcation is then made of the gains and
remaining deﬁciencies in export control development. The author
concludes by examining the applicability of the European Union’s
effort to coordinate export controls to the regional forces shaping the
trade and security dynamics in Asia.
THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT: GREATER REGIONALIZATION
AND INTERDEPENDENCE
Increasing regionalization―regionalization being the complex
network of ﬂows across state boundaries involving the movement of
goods and services, capital, technology, information, and people―
best characterizes the Asian economic context.8 Intra-Asian trade
accounts for about 45 percent of East Asia’s total trade. In addition,
trade throughput via and from the region has increased dramatically
since the late 1960s.9 For example, 11 of the top 20 “megaports” are in
Asia (see Table 1).10
1. Hong Kong
2. Shanghai
3. Singapore
4. Kaohsiung
5. Rotterdam
6. Pusan
7. Bremerhaven

8. Tokyo
9. Genoa
10. Yantian
11. Antwerp
12. Nagoya
13. Le Havre
14. Hamburg

* Bold indicates ports in Asia.

Table 1. World Megaports.
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15. La Spezia
16. Felixstowe
17. Algeciras
18. Kobe
19. Yokohama
20. Laem Chabang

Between 1990 and 2001, Asia’s share of global merchandise and
commercial services exports rose from 21.8 percent to 25 percent,
and 16.8 percent to 20.8 percent, respectively. During the same
period, the comparable share for the Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) countries rose from 4.2 percent to 6.4 percent. The
Chinese share of global exports rose from 1.8 percent to 4.4 percent.11
In the case of China, the last few years have seen much higher levels
of economic interaction with the rest of Asia. Sino-Japanese trade
reached U.S.$53.9 billion in 2002, and exports from China to Japan
increased by 3.1 percent to U.S.$25.7 billion and imports from Japan
rose 14.5 percent to U.S.$28.2 billion. Japan is now China’s second
largest trading partner, while China became the largest importer of
Japanese goods and services in the ﬁrst half of 2002. Hong Kong,
Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and Thailand are also among
China’s top 10 trading partners. Taiwan is China’s ﬁfth-largest
trading partner. Since 1987, trade between mainland China and
Taiwan has totaled almost $2 trillion; it grew at a 7 percent annual
rate in 1999.12
The regional concentration of trade is but one of several indicators
of regionalization. Underlying much of the rapid expansion of
intraregional trade in recent years has been a massive expansion
in foreign direct investment (FDI) ﬂows in the region. Trade policy
reform has ﬁgured prominently in the rising importance of trade
and FDI in the region. Unilateral liberalization of tariff and nontariff
barriers took place in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea,
and Thailand during the 1990s.13 The accelerated relocation of
Japanese production in different parts of Asia has been particularly
signiﬁcant. It has established Japan as the undisputed leader in Asia
in terms of technology transfer, capital goods, and economic aid.14
Having achieved a secure foothold in Korea and Taiwan, Japan
has since rapidly expanded its stake in the ASEAN economies,
and is developing a substantial presence in China and Indochina.
The relocation and off-shore model of production ensures a greater
diffusion of technology.
The interpenetration of national economies is also stimulated by
the exponential growth of ﬁnancial ﬂows across national boundaries,
coupled with the increasing dominance of intra-company as a
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proportion of bilateral trade. The degree of ﬁnancial interdependence
was evidenced by the 1997 ﬁnancial crisis, which resulted in the
Chiang Mai + 3 Initiative.15 Intra-company trade currently accounts
for nearly four-ﬁfths of Japan’s total exports and half of its imports.
Complementing and reinforcing these transnational production
structures is the emergence of such regional economic zones as the
Johor-Singapore-Riau Growth Triangle, the Indonesia-MalaysiaThailand Growth Triangle, the East Asia Growth Area, the Southern
China Growth Triangle, and the Tumen River Delta Economic.16
Finally, mention must be made of the increasing mobility of labor,
with the strongly performing economies of the region attracting
large numbers of legal and illegal immigrants, some of whom may
have links to terrorist organizations.17
Energy sharing has been one of the most notable examples of
regional cooperation. In January 2001, the leaders of Indonesia and
Singapore opened a vital underwater gas pipeline between their
nations. During the next 20 years, this pipeline is expected to channel
more than $8 billion worth of natural gas from Indonesia’s West
Natuna ﬁelds to Singapore. Because wealthy Singapore has virtually
no natural resources, Indonesia viewed its natural gas and other
resources as tools to be used for political gain. Thus the pipeline was
a sizable accomplishment, reﬂecting an increasing maturity in the
political relationship between the two countries. Other gas deals are
in development. Malaysia plans to build a pipeline to West Natuna
and is encouraging Bangkok to develop gas ﬁelds in the Gulf of
Thailand. Similarly, Thailand and Burma have begun extracting
gas from eastern Burma’s Yadana deposits.18 China’s expanding
economy will also require vast infusions of foreign energy, likely
prompting Beijing to attempt to tap into Southeast Asia’s gas ﬁelds.
Meanwhile, in Northeast Asia, Japan has inked several deals to
purchase the majority of Brunei’s oil.19
Nevertheless, the extent, intensity, and efﬁciency of these
economic and functional linkages are clearly limited.20 There are
many states (Cambodia, Laos, North Korea, and several of the
Paciﬁc island states) and many areas within states (e.g., noncoastal
areas of China, parts of Burma, and the Russian Far East), where
these linkages are nonexistent or at best tenuous. Moreover,
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many of the linkages which are said to contribute to regional
interdependence (e.g., Japan-ASEAN trade and investment ﬂows)
are acutely asymmetrical, and, to that extent, likely to promote social
and political tensions both within and across national boundaries.
Nevertheless, both the continuing intermingling of economies and
trade ﬂows and interdependence of ﬁnancial systems deﬁne―and
to some extent delimit―the scope of the “Asian” region in a manner
that transcends the traditional boundaries of states.21
THE SECURITY CONTEXT: MILITARIZATION
AND PROLIFERATION
During the last decade, the top three regions for arms imports―
Western Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia―accounted for 78
percent of the world’s arms imports. Of the top ﬁve arms importing
countries in 2000, two are in East Asia―Japan and Taiwan. Military
spending, armed forces, and arms acquisition are all rising in Asia.
Between 1988 and 1998, as global military expenditures fell by 35
percent, those in East Asia and the Paciﬁc actually increased by 38
percent. (South Asia increased its military spending by 25 percent.)
Figures from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
note that military expenditures declined worldwide from $1.066
trillion in 1988 to $719 billion in 1998. But in Asia, they climbed from
$95 billion to $130 billion.
Japan, China, and the Koreas have accounted for the majority
of the region’s military spending during the past decade, while
the arms race between India and Pakistan has swelled South Asia’s
military budgets. Less visibly, military expenditures in ASEAN
countries increased by 52 percent in real terms between 1988 and
1997. This increase, greater in both absolute and percentage terms
than that of any other region, occurred as the world as a whole cut
military spending by more than one-third (see Table 2).22
The increased spending is going, in large part, to the acquisition
of technologically advanced conventional weapon systems: combat
aircraft, ocean-going naval ships, tanks, armored vehicles, armed
helicopters, and missiles and related dual-use components and
technologies.23 Moreover, much new acquisition is through domestic
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Table 2. Military Expenditure (1993-2002).
arms production. China, Japan, South Korea, India, and Taiwan are
pursuing the development of national arms industries that could
eventually make them, in theory, fully independent of foreign
imports.24
Proliferation continues to pose a particular threat to the security
and stability of East Asia, where several states already have nuclear
weapons and ballistic missile capabilities, and others have the
technical expertise necessary to develop WMD.25 For example, the
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency contends that throughout the
second half of 2001, North Korea continued to export signiﬁcant
ballistic missile-related equipment, components, materials, and
technical expertise to the Middle East, South Asia, and North
Africa.26 P’yongyang attaches high priority to the development
and sale of ballistic missiles, equipment, and related technology.27
Exports of ballistic missiles and related technology are one of the
North’s major sources of hard currency, which fuel continued
missile development and production.28 In addition, in a provocative
decision, North Korea announced on December 12, 2002, that it was
restarting nuclear facilities that had been frozen since 1994, and it
ordered international monitors to leave the country. As international
concern grew that P’yongyang was resuming its nuclear weapons
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program, North Korea announced January 10, 2003, that it was
immediately withdrawing from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT). Shortly thereafter, it began a series of provocative missile
tests, culminating in a test during the inauguration of South Korea’s
new president.29 In addition, many North Korean trading companies
in Southeast Asia―mainly in Thailand, Singapore and Hong Kong―
have been set up with the speciﬁc purpose of obtaining technology
for North Korea’s defense industries (for more in-depth case study,
see Appendix I).30
For its part, Beijing has taken steps to address U.S. and other
concerns and increase its partial participation in international
nonproliferation regimes since 1991.31 Nevertheless, for much of
the 1990s, China’s proliferation record was poor. For example, the
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) noted that, for July-December
1996, “China was the most signiﬁcant supplier of WMD-related
goods and technology to foreign countries.”32 The 1998 report of
the Rumsfeld Commission identiﬁed China’s weapons proliferation
as a “threat.” The DCI’s semi-annual reports have named the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) (plus Russia and North Korea)
as “key suppliers” of dangerous technology.33 Although Chinese
ﬁrms continue to provide some worrisome dual-use assistance to
a few countries (such as Pakistan and Iran), the scope, content,
and frequency of its export of sensitive weapons-related items
has declined and diminished. In the latter half of the 1990s, the
Chinese government began to institutionalize its nonproliferation
commitments by developing its export control infrastructure, a
trend that has continued in recent years. Moreover, an expanding
community of Chinese ofﬁcials, scientists, military ofﬁcers, and
academics involved in arms control and nonproliferation research
and policymaking has helped sensitize senior leaders to the
importance of these issues to the country’s overall foreign policy
and national security.34 China recently gained membership in the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and has expressed similar interest
in joining the Missile Technology Control Regime.35
Finally is the looming threat of terrorism. For example, in a recent
report on the threat of terrorism in South East Asia, the government
of Singapore said that, while some of these groups existed before
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al-Qaeda and have local agendas, their link-up with Osama bin
Laden’s organization had made them more deadly. The report further
noted that although the U.S.-led military strikes on Afghanistan
had disrupted al-Qaeda bases, bin Laden’s network could still tap
alliances in Asia, including Jemaah Islamiah, to stage more attacks:
“With their radical agenda and their enhanced skills acquired from
al-Qaeda, these groups, if left unchecked, will pose a grave threat to
the security of South-East Asia for a long time to come.”36
In summary, growing trade interdependence, increasing
indigenous design and production capabilities (i.e., a growing pool
of potential and actual sensitive technologies suppliers), expanding
military budgets, intensiﬁed technology transfers to and from the
region, and an ever-expanding share of the cargo trade market
represent the regional challenges to the conﬁguration and effective
execution of nonproliferation export controls.
At the global level, governments are also confronted with several
obstacles to practicing effective export controls. Globalization
presents several challenges, such as the transnationalization of the
defense industry, the rapidly blurring distinction between civilian
and military technologies, the increasing intangibility of technology
and its transference, and the incessant need to update control lists
because of the brisk turnovers in technological developments.
The mercurial threat of terrorist use of WMD ampliﬁes these
difﬁculties.37
Overall, the abiding export controls challenge for any government
is identifying, then striking, the proper balance between trade and
security. The very name of this nonproliferation tool is imprecise―
export control―with the connotation being that trade comes at the
expense of security. The nexus of trade and security cuts to the
heart of the matter in Asia, where national economies profoundly
depend on trade, as they do on regional and international security.
The internal challenge for countries of the Asia region is to develop
systems compatible with their political, economic, and security needs
while addressing the overall threat posed by the proliferation of
WMD. The next section examines the gains made by and deﬁciencies
in the nonproliferation export control systems of the Asian region.
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CURRENT ASIAN EXPORT CONTROL DEVELOPMENT:
GAINS AND DEFICIENCIES
In terms of export control development, the Asian region
represents a wide array of stages. However, one of the most
signiﬁcant characteristics of export control policies in East Asia
is the strong correlation between levels of economic growth and
implementation of multilateral export control measures; that is, a
country that started economic growth in an earlier period and has a
high gross domestic product (GDP) level tends to implement more
complete measures of export controls.38 For example, Japan has one
of the most sophisticated export control systems in the world.39 Japan
has also been active in nonproliferation export control regimes,
having been a founding member the Australia Group, the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the NSG, and the Wassenaar
Arrangment.
In addition, the Japanese government has played a key leadership
role in regional nonproliferation export controls by establishing basic
guidelines that include nonproliferation factors in providing ofﬁcial
development assistance (e.g., Ofﬁcial Development Assistance
[ODA] Charter implemented in 1991)40 and by disseminating
information on export controls through multilateral seminars (e.g.,
Asian Export Control Seminar started in 1993), bilateral talks, and
training programs.41 In 1994, Japan also introduced a General Bulk
License comparable to similar procedures in the United States
and Europe. The procedure rewards Japanese trading partners for
setting up export control programs by simplifying and shortening
licensing procedures. In the region, Hong Kong (April 1994) and
South Korea (October 1994) were the ﬁrst to receive this status.
Since more than 64 percent of Japanese exports of the items formerly
controlled by the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export
Controls (COCOM) go to countries in the region, all of which require
licenses, the Japanese government hopes this will help induce more
of its regional neighbors to adopt complementary export control
systems.42 For example, Japan received a South Korean task force
team of export control ofﬁcials in September 2002 to assist with the
introduction of catch-all controls in Republic of Korea (ROK). Other
recent bilateral initiatives include bilateral agreements signed with
9

Hong Kong and Singapore aimed at preventing indirect exports of
products that can be converted into weapons.43
In other states of the region, export control developments varied
in 2002. For example, China passed a raft of legislation related to
nuclear, chemical and biological, missile, and military exports.44
Taiwan updated its export regulations with regard to Mainland trade.
South Korea implemented a catch-all regulation, and Singapore
passed legislation strengthening state control over the export of
strategic goods, including munitions and related dual-use goods.45
Other states, such as Laos, Myanmar, and Malaysia, have made only
minor, primarily legislative, changes, most of which are superﬁcial.
For example, despite U.S. efforts to persuade Malaysia to adopt more
stringent nuclear export controls, its foreign minister said that he
did not currently “see any necessity” to sign the Additional Protocol
to Malaysia’s nuclear safeguards agreement. Recent disclosures
about Libya’s nuclear program revealed that a Malaysian ﬁrm
manufactured some of Tripoli’s nuclear equipment.46
While other control systems in the region may not be as
comprehensive as Japan’s, it is important to consider that individual
economic and political proﬁles are relevant to the form of the export
control system. To use the Japanese example again, Japan is a key
supplier country, a major economic and political power, as well
as a transshipment point. Comprehensive licensing, enforcement,
and regime adherence elements are appropriate to its political and
economic particulars. Mongolia, on the other hand, is not a supplier
country and therefore may not have comprehensive end-use checks
or extensive government outreach functions in place. Indonesia,
furthermore, lists only one industry―P. T. Pindad―as exporting
controlled goods and technologies and therefore does not require a
signiﬁcant industry outreach capacity. Nevertheless, while the forms
may vary, there must be a higher degree of harmonization between
states of the region to ensure that loopholes are not exploited. To that
end, three critical areas requiring further attention remain.47
Technology Controls and Control List Harmonization.
The vast majority of Asian countries still do not have adequate
technology controls in place. With only Japan and South Korea
10

being members of the multilateral export control arrangements,
coordinating national export control systems with international
norms is a problem. For example, as of late 2001, 7 out of 17 countries
had no or only partial controls over the export or transit of sensitive
technologies.48 One country does not have controls on items from
any of the multilateral lists, while another does not control goods
on the NSG and Australia Group lists. A third country has no legal
controls on dual-use equipment that could be used for chemical
weapons (CW) and biological weapons (BW). Finally, while another
maintains no formal controls on the items on the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) schedules or on biological weapons, it does
control CW- and BW-related dual-use equipment. Furthermore, the
majority of surveyed countries lack national control lists that reﬂect
those of the four multilateral export control regimes. However, a few
countries, such as Singapore, are in the process of harmonizing their
control lists (see Table 3).
Goods
Arms, Nuclear/ Dual-use items
BCW Missile
Related item
Brunei
Cambodia
China
Hong Kong, China
Indonesia
Japan
Korea
Laos
Macau, China
Malaysia
Mongolia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Chinese Taipei
Thailand
Viet Nam

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Partial
Yes
Yes
Partial
Yes
Partial
Partial
Yes
Partial
Partial
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Partial
Partial
Yes
Partial
Yes
Yes
Partial
Yes
Partial
Partial
Partial
No
Partial
Partial
Partial
Partial

Table 3. Scope of Control, 2002.
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Technology

No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Partial
Partial
No
No
Partial
Yes
Partial

While an important exercise, the harmonization of national control
lists for regime nonmembers need not be an exacting process. An
emerging trend in the practice of export controls is the move to
so-called “activity-based” controls from the purely control list
approach.49
1. The control-list approach focuses on the nature of the product
or technology itself, and regulates export through product
control lists. Typically, under this approach, an exporter ﬁrst
determines whether its product is covered by the product list
and, if so, then consults the product list to determine what
restrictions, if any, apply to the export of the product.
2. The activity-based approach, by contrast, focuses on the
nature of the transaction and the identity of the exporter and
its partners in the deal. It is not limited to an examination of
the speciﬁc product being shipped. The purpose of an activitybased approach is to control certain dangerous activities,
such as the proliferation of nuclear or chemical weapons or
the advancement of terrorist organizations.
As the nature of the proliferation threat becomes geographically
boundless, the role of activity-based controls has become increasingly signiﬁcant as a mechanism for enforcing export control policy.
Studies have indicated that proliferant countries often seek threshold
or decontrolled technology for their WMD programs.50 Furthermore,
the events of September 11, 2001, have accelerated this changing
trend in, for example, U.S. export control legislation. The “bad
guys” are no longer limited to a particular country.51 As a result, all
transactions, even those that seem purely domestic, and transactions
in “friendly countries,” now fall under the scope of export control
laws. Countries, therefore, must have the ability to control exports
irrespective of list content. This ﬂexibility has otherwise caused a
catch-all clause, a tool not readily in abundance in the Asian region.
Catch-All Controls.
National control systems focus on the end-use and end-user of
goods and technologies, allowing more freedom to transfer dual-
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use technologies to commercial end-users for commercial end-uses.
Post-Gulf War disclosures of the operational means of Iraqi front
companies furthered the spread of catch-all. Heightened concerns
over terrorist acquisition of WMD components and technologies
highlight the preventative role offered by catch-all legislation.
A “catch-all” regulation is the means by which governments apply
existing national export control procedures to goods and technologies
not on national control lists when it is known or suspected that such
goods of technologies will be used in WMD programs. This type of
regulation is also known as “end use” regulation, because it requires
that exporters ensure that their exports of dual-use products have
legitimate end uses.52
Japan, for example, amended two cabinet orders to introduce a
catch-all control in December 2001. The new regulation came into
force in April 2002. Under the new control, the export of items which
are not included in the export control list requires export license of
the items that are for use in connection with WMD and their delivery
means. To ensure the effectiveness of the catch-all clause, the
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) provides exporters
the “End User List” that indicates end users of proliferation concern.
South Korea also enacted a catch-all clause in early 2003.
With respect to China, ofﬁcials believe they have the authority
and already have implemented catch-all controls for several kinds
of nonproliferation items. Moreover, the Ministry of Foreign Trade
and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) can restrict both nuclear and
nuclear dual-use items that do not appear on the list.53 Allegedly,
ofﬁcials also interpret catch-all controls to permit restrictions on email and fax transfers of technology. Ofﬁcials indicate, however, that
they need assistance in devising means to control these intangible
forms of technology transfer effectively. In contrast, at least one
source claimed that the government must put chemical items on
the list before they can exercise controls, although the regulations
would then allow ofﬁcials to restrict a host of associated production
equipment and technologies. Although the central government
appears to have the authority to use catch-all controls, the process
for implementing these controls seems ambiguous.54
Apart from Japan and South Korea, the majority of reporting
Asian states either lack completely or do not have multilateral
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export control regime standard catch-all control regulations.
This characteristic is further reinforced by the relative absence of
information that regional governments provide their exporters and
transportation industries on end users and entities of concern. With
the exception of a few countries, regional governments―to the extent
they provide any export control-related information―share only the
minimal amount of information, usually pertaining to compliance
requirements. The functional essence of the catch-all regulation is
a greater responsibility on behalf of industry to ensure that end use
and end user are in no way illicit. Yet, industry must be adequately
informed.
Reexport and Transshipment Controls.
Another way to maximize the ability to administer and enforce
export controls is to focus international monitoring and enforcement
efforts on major chokepoints in the ﬂow of global commerce. A
signiﬁcant amount of global trade passes through a handful of major
transshipment hubs―most of which are in the Asia region―that
serve as key distribution points in the global economy. For example,
the equivalent of more than 50 million containers a year has passed
through the major ports of Southeast Asia in recent years.55
Such hubs potentially could be used by terrorists or countries
of concern to divert sensitive items to unauthorized destinations or
end users. Tighter national export controls and greater international
cooperation have made direct access to items more difﬁcult for end
users of proliferation concern. Proliferators increasingly are likely
to use transit points in unsuspecting destinations to conceal the
real nature of the transaction. They falsify cargo descriptions, do
not enter end-user/user destinations, hide the ﬁnal destination, use
front companies, and try other ruses.56
Most of the countries surveyed do not have legislation covering
re-exports or transshipment controls. This relative deﬁciency is
perhaps the most serious export control challenge, in light of the fact
that most countries are―in proliferation terms―not suppliers but
transshipment points, whose economies depend on the efﬁciencies
and speed of trade facilitation. Compounding matters is the relative
proximity of key technology suppliers, such as Japan and South
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Korea.57 For example, according to a Tokyo Metropolitan Police
Department press release, authorities arrested the former managing
director of the Ryokasha Company and Hitachi for conspiring to sell
telecomparators to China.58 The sale of telecomparators is in violation
of a Japanese law established by the Nuclear Suppliers Group in
1992. This device can be modiﬁed to develop an apparatus for the
extraction of weapons grade plutonium. The company allegedly
used South Korea as a transshipment point to avoid Japanese
export controls to its ﬁnal destination in Harbin, China. According
to the police investigation, 3 months after 18 telecomparators were
shipped to Harbin in December 1996, the Ryokosha company sent
technicians to offer assistance and to repair the products.59
Another case involved Singapore as a transshipment point. In
May 2001, U.S. Customs Special Agents in Baltimore initiated an
investigation based on a referral made by the Defense Security
Service which alleged that a U.S. national was attempting to
acquire sophisticated encryption technology and related data for
illegal export to the PRC. The technology is controlled for export
under the U.S. Munitions List of the International Trafﬁcking in
Arms Regulations and by the National Security Agency. Based
on the referral, an undercover investigation was initiated, and the
perpetrators were arrested for attempting to unlawfully export the
encryption devices to the PRC via Singapore.60
Addressing the 2002 Southeast Asian regional forum on
transshipment controls in Bangkok, the State Department’s Bureau
of Nonproliferation, Director of the Ofﬁce of Export Control
Cooperation John Schlosser, remarked:
State sponsors of terrorism and terrorist organizations increasingly are
attempting to exploit the less-stringent controls that exist in the world’s
transshipment hubs―often by diverting legitimate trade or through front
companies posing as honest brokers. Unless transshipment countries―
like those you represent here today―catch up with these supplier states
and similarly strengthen their export control systems, they will remain
an attractive target for this kind of predatory trade.61

With notable exceptions, the export control systems of Asia are
resource poor. While overall progress in export control development
is evident, individual discrepancies continue to pose threats to
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regional and international security.62 As noted above, increasing
economic integration and interdependence creates a natural base
upon which to develop regional export control resources and greater
coordination, although, until 1997, the region was slow to pursue
collective responses to regional public goods problems.
A REGIONAL RESPONSE:
THE EUROPEAN UNION CASE AS MODEL
Export controls combine trade and security policy; to this extent,
regional economic integration and harmonization presume some
degree of security policy cooperation. An instructive model for
future regional export control developments is the European Union
(EU).63
As a consequence of increasingly harmonized trade policy,
the EU eventually addressed the issue of a common framework
for the export of dual-use and goods and technologies from the
community in the 1990s. Presently, the 15 member states operate
under a common control list and set of export guidelines (e.g., such
as an EU-level catch-all clause requirement), recognize a common
license, regularly share licensing and enforcement information, and
are subject to compliance reviews. In addition, until the year 2000,
an EU member state easily could grant an export license for an
item for which the authorities of another member state had refused
authorization. Under a new regulation, such undercutting can
provoke considerable peer pressure. Member states now have to 1)
inform each other on denials of export licenses; 2) consult with each
other on their intention to undercut; and, 3) explain their decision
to do so.64 The EU is also coordinating members state export control
assistance to the 10 inductees.
In Asia, the concept of “comprehensive” or “integrated” security,
which would include nonproliferation export control efforts, initially
was championed by Japan in the late 1970s.65 It was developed further
by ASEAN in the 1980s. In the 1990s, when China made increasing
use of the concept, it gained even wider currency throughout Asia.
Throughout most of the Asia region, the Asian ﬁnancial crisis of 1997
has reinforced further the belief that security must be understood
in “comprehensive” terms that go beyond traditional military
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connotations.66 Similarly, the regional terrorist threat has galvanized
calls for regional threat management.67
ASEAN, established initially as a trade and development
forum, has, in fact, sought to coordinate regional nonproliferation
efforts. ASEAN has hosted seminars on nonproliferation and
initiated the 1995 Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear WeaponsFree Zone (Bangkok Treaty). Recently, Japanese trade minister
Shoichi Nakagwa called on Japan and ASEAN to tighten export
controls jointly on materials for WMD as an effort to ﬁght against
terrorism.68
The Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Council (APEC) also has begun to
address the link between trade and security. The ﬁrst major meeting
of APEC for 2004 provided encouragment for member nations to
sign on to international nonproliferation treaties.69 In addition,
APEC members agreed to a series of joint actions to ensure that
key Paciﬁc Rim infrastructure in the areas of trade, ﬁnance, and
information systems is protected by “Enhancing Secure Trade in the
APEC Region (STAR),” which includes calls for greater coordination
on container, aviation, and transit security.
While such economic organizations as ASEAN and APEC are by
no means the organizational equivalents of the EU, they can provide
a framework for the creation of many of the export control norms,
best practices and information sharing functions.70 For example,
these organizations could host seminars on transshipment controls
involving regional governments and freight forwarding, customs
brokers, and the shipping industry―in addition to serving as
information sharing platforms on end users of concern. Such services
would reduce the institutional costs to national governments while
increasing awareness of key export control issues.
Beyond supplying export control resources to and facilitating
the coordination of policy of area governments, a regional
solution also should be sought regarding informing and assisting
industry.71 Government outreach to industry represents one of the
least developed aspects of national export controls in Asia. While
Japan’s METI, for example, collaborates with a nongovernmental
organization, the Center for Information on Security Trade Control,
to work with industry in developing compliance programs, other
states do not have similar programs. A regional solution also would
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include ways and means by which to assist regional governmental
outreach efforts to industry, an aspect otherwise lacking from
ASEAN or APEC agendas.
On the basis of further economic regionalization, a regional
solution is the most appropriate means to address the respective
export control deﬁciencies. In spite of that, such an outcome depends
entirely on strong leadership and support. The United States has
provided a great deal of bilateral export control assistance to many
states in the region. For example, the U.S. Department of Commerce
recently launched the Transshipment Country Export Control
Initiative (TECI).72 Perhaps more importantly, Japan has been
providing such leadership and support for the past decade. Given the
accelerated export control developments in China, Beijing should be
encouraged to seek broader regional coordination on export control
issues. At the 2003 ASEAN summit, for example, China proposed
the establishment of a new security mechanism. Under the rubric of
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the organization’s mechanism
for security discussions, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing
proposed forming a conference to increase communication among
Asian militaries. In addition, Japan and China hosted their ﬁrst
joint export control seminar in Beijing on March 5, 2004, for Chinese
ﬁrms.73
CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF EXPORT CONTROLS
IN THE ASIAN REGION
When compared with supplier state export control systems such
as the United States and Japan, most states in the region have only
the most rudimentary of control systems. That being said, however,
regional governments have been making progress on addressing
systematic deﬁciencies on a voluntary and, more importantly, a
cooperative basis. To sustain this progress, participating states must
understand that export controls are not impediments to trade. On
the contrary, they are the prerequisites for ensuring the necessary
international and regional stability and technology transfer on
which economic development and growth depend.
As Asia develops into a clearly demarcated economic “region,”
it is confronted by similar export control challenges as those faced
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in Europe with the advent of the Common Market. As such, a
regional system of export control standards and practices emerged
as a means to ensure not only economic parity, but also regional and
international security. While not necessarily as advanced in terms of
regional identity as the European free trade area, the states of Asia
could proﬁtably beneﬁt from a regional approach to export control
development and coordination.
To help facilitate export control developments in Asia, U.S.
leadership and resources are essential. To meet this objective, the
United States should pursue the following:
• Provide export control resources and training. Since the
early 1990s, the U.S. Government has provided these for the
countries of the former Soviet Union. Such assistance is now
required in the Asia region. Bilateral export control cooperative
programs are now in the ofﬁng with countries like Singapore
and China. Working with regional nonproliferation leaders
like Japan, the United States must expand the scope of its
export control programs to include countries with ﬂedgling
trade control systems, such as Malaysia.
• Hold China to its nonproliferation commitments. In May 2004,
China joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group, thereafter seeking
entry into the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
China’s recent domestic and international export control
developments must be matched against a marked change
in behavior. The United States must serve as guarantor that
Beijing will adhere to its growing battery of nonproliferation
commitments, as Chinese inaction could undermine export
control developments made elsewhere in the region.
• Expand Asian involvement in the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) and Container Security Initiative (CSI). PSI
and CSI are responses to the growing challenge posed by the
proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems, and related
materials worldwide. Greater Asian participation in both
programs is necessary for their collective success.
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• Foster and sustain political support. As countries in the
region further develop their respective export control
capacities―especially China―on-going U.S. support will be
critical to achieving this end. While ﬁnancial and intellectual
support is fundamental to this task, political and diplomatic
support will be required to ensure that domestic political
endorsement for these undertakings remains high.
Above all, the abiding export control challenge for any
government is identifying, then striking, the proper balance between
trade and security. In this respect, it is critical that export controls are
not viewed as impediments to trade. The nexus of trade and security
cuts to the heart of the matter in Asia, where national economies
depend greatly on trade, as they do on regional and international
security. The internal challenge for countries of the Asia region is
to develop systems compatible with their political, economic, and
security needs while addressing the overall threat posed by the
proliferation of WMD.
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APPENDIX I
ACQUISITION CASE STUDY:
NORTH KOREAN COMPANIES AND COMMERCIAL
ACTIVITIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA1
In line with directives issued by North Korea’s Ministry of the People’s
Armed Forces and Bureau 39 of the Korean Workers’ Party, North Korean
embassies and trading companies in Southeast Asia have been mobilized
to raise hard currency for the state and the party. Next to the Middle
East, where North Korea is making vast amounts of money from its trade
in ballistic missiles and missile technology, Southeast Asia is the most
important place for the North Koreans to do business. In brief, the North
Koreans are raising money and conducting their businesses in the region
in the following ﬁve different ways.
1. DPRK Embassies.
The embassies themselves import duty free cars, liquor, perfume,
and cigarettes, which they sell on the black market. This is the practice,
especially in Thailand, whose laws are not always as forcefully enforced as
is the case in, for instance, Singapore and Malaysia. Money raised in this
manner most probably is used to ﬁnance the operations of the embassies,
as they have been told to be self-sufﬁcient, and they do not receive enough
funding from Pyongyang. In early 2001, fake U.S.$100 notes also turned
up in Bangkok. One of the North Korean diplomats there was caught redhanded trying to deposit the forgeries in a local bank.
2. DPRK Trading Companies.
Connected with the embassies, but not part of them, is a maze of
supposedly privately-owned trading companies. In Thailand, for instance,
a company which is ofﬁcially registered as Kosun Import-Export and
permitted to trade in rice, rubber, paper, tapioca, and clothing, also owns
an eight-story building in Bangkok and is involved in property. It rents out
ﬂats and ofﬁce space in the building it owns. Money earned in this manner
is used to ﬁnance the embassy in Bangkok, and to support the regime in
Pyongyang.
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3. DPRK Defense Technology Transfer.
Other North Korean-trading companies in Southeast Asia―mainly in
Thailand, Singapore, and Hong Kong―have been set up with the speciﬁc
purpose of obtaining technology for North Korea’s defense industries. In
the past, much of this technology could be obtained in Japan through the
Chosen Soren, but stricter controls by Japanese authorities have prompted
the North Koreans to look elsewhere for electronic goods produced by
Japan and other countries. Since this activity is of a more clandestine
nature than more ordinary trading carried out by companies such as
Kosun, they carefully disguise the location and nature of the company
in question. One such company in Bangkok is Kotha Trading (KoreaThailand). It has one North Korean shareholder―the managing director of
the company―who carries a diplomatic passport from North Korea. The
others are “sleeping” Thai partners. According to the Thai companies’
registry, it is supposed to be dealing in ceramics. But ﬁrst, the address
at which it is ofﬁcially registered―an ofﬁce block not far from the North
Korean embassy in Bangkok―is not where its actual ofﬁce is located. That
is more than two kilometers away in another ofﬁce block where it shares
facilities with three or four Thai electronics companies. Kotha Trading is
connected with a world-wide network of North Korean trading companies
that are procuring spare parts and components for North Korea’s defense
industries, including its ballistic missile programs. Goods are shipped
either directly to North Korea, or indirectly through China. Similar
companies also operate in Hong Kong and Singapore. There are about a
dozen North Korean Trading Companies in Hong Kong, and about the
same number in Singapore.
4. Proxy Companies.
Because of restrictions in Japan, Japanese goods destined for North
Korea are often rerouted through countries such as Thailand. In November
last year, for instance, a company in Tokyo called Meishin, which is owned
by local businessmen connected with the Chosen Soren, ﬁrst attempted to
export three power-control devices to North Korea. But when the Japanese
authorities refused to issue an export license, the three devices were
disguised as something else and sent to Bangkok. The recipient in Bangkok
was not a North Korean-owned company―which would have been too
suspicious―but a perfectly legitimate Thai company, Loxley Paciﬁc, one
of Thailand’s leading telecommunications ﬁrms. But Loxley also has an
investment in North Korea where it is installing a mobile phone system.
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In this case, the goods never reached North Korea. They were seized
by customs in Hong Kong, where the ship stopped on its way to Bangkok,
because the documents accompanying the power-control devices were
not in order. In converted use, these power-control devices can be used
in the production of WMD. Loxley, however, claimed that “The electricity
situation is poor in North Korea . . . they need stabilizers to avoid hurting
their household appliances.” A less than likely explanation, but it shows
how the North Koreans are also using third-party middlemen to get the
goods they require to North Korea.
5. Direct Procurement and Acquisition.
The ﬁfth area of activity is even more intriguing as it is characterized
by direct procurement and acquisition of controlled materials. In Thailand,
a North Korean-owned company, Wolmyongsan Progress Joint Venture,
was engaged for years in mining activities near the Burmese border in
western Thailand. It is unclear what minerals it was mining, and if it
was to sell them to make money, or use them in North Korea’s defense
industries. But Thai sources suspect they were looking for uranium and
other strategic minerals. Wolmyongsan is no longer active in Thailand,
but another North Korean mining company has been detected in Laos, a
communist-run state with close relations to North Korea. The company,
Chosun-Lao Seok Hoisa (in Korean: “the Korea-Laos Stone Company”), is
said to be mining for tin at four locations around Sup Sitae near Hinboun
in Khammouane province. However, it may also be looking for other more
strategic minerals. In recent months, North Korean mining specialists have
also been spotted at a location 7 kms south of Taunggyi in the Shan State of
Burma. The cooperation with Burma is new, as relations between the two
countries were broken after North Korean agents placed a powerful bomb
in Rangoon in 1983, killing several visiting South Korean government
ministers.
ENDNOTE
1. Study is derived wholly from Bertil Lintner, “North Korean Companies and
Commercial Activities in Southeast Asia,” Jane’s Consultancy, paper presented at
the 11th Asian Export Control Seminar, October 18-20, 2003, Tokyo, Japan. Please
do not cite without author’s approval.
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